Confiscation and Corporations in Conflict of Laws by Editors, Law Review
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
CONFISCATION AND CORPORATIONS IN
CONFLICT OF LAWS
From i918 to 1921 revolutionary committees of the R.S.F.S.R., which later
became a republic of the Soviet Union, passed and enforced decrees purporting
to dissolve Russian corporations, to confiscate their property, and in many
lines of business to nationalize commercial and industrial enterprise. In many
of the courts of the world, the question has arisen as to the effect of the con-
fiscation upon property belonging to Russian corporations but recoverable
abroad. The legal answer to this question depends on (i) the interpretation
of the Soviet decrees in regard to the corporate entity; (2) the nature and situs
of the property; and (3) the effect of anti-confiscatory policies in countries
other than Russia. This question had been resolved in favor of" the Russian
corporations and stockholders and creditors claiming under them. The Soviet
government, however, had one recourse left. It could assign by international
negotiation its rights based on its confiscation decrees to a foreign government
which could then sue debtors to Russian corporations found within its territory.
The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Belmont, suggests that the Soviet resort to diplomacy has met with partial
success.
I
In the Belmont case, a Russian corporation of the imperial regime prior to
1918 deposited a sum of money with a private New York banker. In 1918 the
Soviets enacted decrees dissolving the corporation and confiscating its property.
In 1933, the United States recognized the Soviet Union on terms 2 which in-
cluded an assignment from the Soviet Union to the United States of its claims
against American natiorals and a duty on the part of the United States to
notify the Soviet Union of its collections. The United States, as assignee, sued,
in the southern district of New York, the executor of the New York banker
for the sum of money deposited by the Russian corporation. It was held3 on
a motion to dismiss that, as against the executor and Russian creditors and
stockholders, the United States can recover the sum, but American and prob-
ably non-Russian-foreign creditors and stockholders can set up defenses at
Federal law against the United States; no defenses at New York law, however,
will be available because the assignment from the Soviet Union to the United
States has the status of a treaty. A minority4 of the court concurred only on
1 3-1 U.S. 324 (1937).
2For text, see 28 Am. J. Int. Law Supp. No. i, Official Documents, io (1934); State of
Russia v. National City Bank, 69 F. (2d) 44, 46 (1934). See also Anderson, Recognition of
Russia, 28 Am. J. Int. Law 90 (1934); Jessup, The Litvinoff Assignment and the Belmont
Case, 31 Am. J. Int. Law 481 (1937).
3 Sutherland, J., speaking for Hughes, C. J., McReynolds, Butler, Roberts, and Van De-
vanter, J. J., 301 U.S. 324, 325-333 (1937).
4 Stone, J., speaking for Brandeis, Cardozo, J. J., 301 U.S. 324, 333-337 (1937).
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the proposition that the United States can recover the sum as against the
executor. A motion by the New York receiver of the Russian corporation to
intervene in the case was refused,s presumably without prejudice to later action
against the United States.6
On the question of what defenses creditors and stockhol~ers can raise against
the right of the United States, the majority and minority opinions differ. The
minority, refusing to discuss the possible status of the assignment as a treaty,
declared the effect of the assignment was to pass to the United States no more
than the Soviet Union had, and the executor had no standing to challenge
that effect, but they added that if New York had a policy allowing "local" to
prevail over "foreign" creditors, that state could refuse to enforce "external
transfers to property within its borders."7
If the last clause of the Fifth Amendment is applied in its natural meaning,
the deposit must first satisfy the claims of creditors and stockholders of the
Russian corporation who are of any nationality other than Russian.8 The re-
mainder will be handed over to the United States. Creditors will, of course,
come before stockholders, and creditors whose claims arose from transactions
in this country may come before creditors whose claims arose from transactions
abroad.9 However, statutes of limitation, affecting claimants other than the
United" States, ° and natural dispersion of persons interested in the corporation
over the twenty years since it ceased to do business suggest that the United
States may in the end recover something on this claim and others like it.
The partial success in enforcing rights based on confiscation in the Belmont
case has been regarded by commentators" as a surprising increase in the con-
stitutional treaty-making power of the executive. An examination of the under-
lying problems in the conflict of laws reveals, however, that the result reached
is not unjustifiable and renders the constitutional law difficulties intelligible
and perhaps unimportant.
The legal routine in the Russian cases has not been illuminating: the Soviet
decrees are enforcible only in Soviet territory; extraterritorial enforcibility in
s United States v. Belmont, 300 U.S. 641 (1936).
6 The receiver was only custodian of the corporate property which was not impounded by
court process. The rights of American creditors were expressly saved by the Belmont case. See
Moore and Levi, Federal Intervention I, 45 Yale L. J. 565, 581, 586, 589 (1936).
7301 U.S. 324, 333-337 (1937).
8 . .... nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation,"
U.S. Const., Art. V; see Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 289 U.S. 481 (1930).
9 People v. Russian Reinsurance Co., 255 N.Y. 415, 175 N.E. 114 (1931); People v. Second
Russian Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 436, 175 N.E. 121 (1931).
"0 United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 91 F. (2d) 898 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1937), noted, 5 Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 313 (1938).
- Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the President in International Relations, 25
Calif. L. Rev. 643, 670 (1937); 51 Harv. L. Rev. 162 (1937); 47 Yale L. J. 292 (1937); 23 Va.
L. Rev. 95 (1937); 22 Minn. L. Rev. 114 (1937).
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foreign courts must rest on international comity; the comity does not require
anything at all in a: mandatory sense, certainly not enforcement of any foreign
law contrary to the public policy of the forum; the confiscation of private
property without compensation is the purport of the confiscation decrees and
is contrary to public, capitalistic policy; the decrees, therefore, cannot be
enforced in the states of the forum.2
It might seem that uncompensated confiscation would be so anathematic
to courts in capitalistic countries's that no Russian confiscation would be under
any circumstances recognized abroad. This, however, has not been the case.
Where a chattel was in Russia at the time of the decree and subsequently re-
moved, the validity of the confiscation decree has, except before recognition
of the Soviet Union,4 been upheld.s Since it is arguable that the policy against
confiscation is equally strong regardless of where the chattel was at the time of
the decree, it would seem that the clue to these cases lies not in policy of the
forum but rather in jurisdiction of the confiscating state. If, then, there can
be confiscation effective to create rights which will be recognized in foreign
courts, the question is one of finding its requirements.
It is clear that when all the elements are local the decree will be recognized
abroad. 6 The problem arises when either the property or its owners is in the
12 Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924); The Jupiter, [1927]
P. D. 122, 250; Etat Russe v. Ropit, Cour de Cass., March 5, 1928, 55 Clunet 674; Wilbusche-
witz v. Ville de Zurich, Trib. Fed. (Swiss), July 13, 1925, 53 Clunet riio; Ginsberg v. Deutsche
Bank, K. G., Berlin, March 3, 1925, x Ostrecht 163.
X3 For legislative policy against Soviet confiscation in New York, see N.Y.C.P.A. § 169-a,
held unconstitutional in Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 244 N.Y. 482, 155 N.E. 749
(1927). But see N.Y.C.P.A. § 977-b.
The most recent expression of judicial policy against Soviet confiscation can be found in
Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York and Trust Co., 161 Misc. 903, 294 N.Y. Supp. 648
(1937), in which the United States intervened on the strength of the Litvinov assignment,
but the court evidently felt not bound by the Belmont case because New York courts had
taken jurisdiction of the fund in question before the Litvinov assignment was negotiated. See
United States v. Bank of New York and Trust Co., 77 F. 2nd. 88o (C.C.A. 2nd 1934).
As to Federal policy, see suggestion, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 114 (1937), that the Litvinov assign-
ment may express a policy superior to Federal anti-confiscatory law. But see Const. Art. V.
'4 Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 1 K.B. 456; Bounatian v. Soci6t6 Optorg, Trib. Civ. Seine, Dec.
12, 1923, 51 Clunet 133.
IS United States: Salimoff v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, x86 N.E. 679 (1933); Banque
de France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F. (2d) 202 (C.C.A. 2nd 1929).
England: Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 3 K.B. 532; Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, [1929] 1 K.B.
718.
Gerniany: Caucasian Licorice Co. v. Katz, L. G., Hamburg, June 13, 1924, x Ostrecht 165.
Italy: R. S. F. S. R. v. Romische Schwefelgesellschaft, Ct. of Cass., Italy, April 25, 1925.
r Ostrecht 178.
Switzerland: Dame P. v. S., Trib. Sup. Zurich, Dec. 1S, 1928, 57 Clunet ri59, involving a
debt treated as a chattel, not a chattel. See Nebolsine, Recovery of Foreign Assets of National-
ized Russian Corporations, 39 Yale L. J. 1130, 1154 (1930).
16 Dame P. v. S., Trib. Sup. Zurich, Dec. 18, 1928, 57 Clunet ii59.
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confiscating state at the time of confiscation. Where-the property is tangible
there is the old question of whether control over the owner's person or control
over the property itself is the compelling factor. The general result in the
Russian cases has been to recognize the confiscation if the chattel was in Russia
at the time of confiscation decree, 7 but not to recognize it if the chattel was
outside at the time. 8 This result making the situs of the property dominant
has several precedents19 and analogies.2° Some analogies sustain the Russian
cases.
Assignees in compulsory"x bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings, for example,
can only reach the debtor's property abroad subject to attachment or assign-
ment to local creditors either before 2 or after 23 the proceedings. Where there
are local creditors or ancillary receivers, a receiver of a corporation does not
17 Note 14, supra.
18 The Jupiter, [1927] P.D. 122, 250; Etat Russe v. Ropit, Cour de Cass., March 5, 1928,
55 Clunet 674.
29 South and Central American appropriation and confiscation. Hamilton v. Accessory
Transit Co., 26 Barb. (N.Y.) 46 (1857); American Banana Co., v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.
347 (i918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (i918); Shapleigh v. Meier, 299 U.S.
468 (r936).
So with confiscation by belligerents, Frankel & Co. v. L'Urbaine Fire Ins. Co., 251 N.Y.
243, 167 N.E. 430 (1929); Wolf v. Oxholm, 6 Maule & S. 92 (x817); Peru v. Dreyfus Bros.
38 Ch. Div. 348 (888); Folliot v. Ogden, i H. Black. 123 (1789); Second Russian Ins. Co. v.
Miller, 268 U.S. 552 (1924), except where a revolutionary belligerent power is not ultimately
successful. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176 (1877).
Absence of a revolutionary situation apparently permits enforcement of a foreign statutory
corporate reorganization having confiscatory effect. Canadian Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard,
109 U.S. 527 (1883); Hudson River Pulp Paper Co. v. Warner & Co., 99 Fed. 187 (C.C.A. 2nd
igoo). A German statute, product of the National Socialist "revolution," requiring Ger-
man debtors to foreigners to pay the debts to the German government was not enforced in the
United States. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske Actien-Gesellschaft,
15 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. N.Y. 1936).
20 The penal decrees, statutory or judicial, of one nation have never been enforced in the
courts of another nation. Rosa Catana v. Potocki, Trib. Civ. Seine, May 7, 1873, 2 Clunet 20;
Lecouturier v. Rey, [igio] A.C. 203; Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580 (191o); Duc de Cam-
bridge v. Duc de Brunswick, Cour Royale, Jan. 16, 1836, [1836] Sirey II 70, 78.
21 A prior voluntary assignment by a debtor apparently has universal validity. Crapo v.
Kelly, x6 Wall. (U.S.) 61o (1872).
-Clark v. Willard, 292 U.S. 112 (1933), 294 U.S. 211 (1934).
23 Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch (U.S.) 289 (18o9).
For other types of transfers which defeat prior insolvency proceedings, see: Mitchell v.
Banco de Londres, 192 App. Div. 720, 183 N.Y. Supp. 446 (1920); Holmes v. Remsen, 20
Johns. (N.Y.) 229 (1822); Lessee of McCullough's Heirs v. Rodrick, 2 Ohio 235 (1826).
The English courts, on issuing a compulsory order for winding up a corporation whose prin-
cipal assets are abroad, apparently expect the order to receive full enforcement abroad. In re
General Co., L.R. 5 Ch. App. 363 (1870); In re Madrid-Valencia Ry. Co., 19 L. J. Ch. (N.S.)
26o (i85o). This expectation suffered early disappointment in the United States. Harrison v.
Sterry, 5 Cranch (U.S.) 289 (i8og).
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have power2 4 to collect chattels s or to transfer assets26 lying in a foreign state
but belonging to the corporation whose liquidation he is authorized to super-
vise. A statutory successor to the assets of a corporation may, however, have
such power.2 7 Equitable or statutory mortgage foreclosure ordinarily 5 does not
affect land situated in a foreign state2 9 nor does probate of a devise.30 Dis-
tribution of property by the law of intestate succession at the intestate's domicil
does not affect his land in a foreign state.3'
These examples are analogical to the Soviet confiscation decrees because a
judgment or decree of a court has set in motion the state's executive imple-
ments of coercion and force which can be effective only within and not beyond
the boundaries of the state. So the Soviet decrees, although they purported
to be legislation, were orders to Soviet committees setting in motion a standard,
often violent, revolutionary procedure achieving effective dissolution of Russian
corporations and confiscation of their assets within Soviet territory.3'
Other analogies, however, lend some force to an argument that the Soviet
decrees might be effective beyond the Soviet boundaries. Courts of equity
have granted decrees in personam ordering the conveyance of foreign land33
24 The rule in the Federal courts is a strict territorial limitation on the powers of receivers.
Booth v. Clark, 17 How. (U.S.) 322 (1854); Laughlin, The Extraterritorial Powers of Receivers,
45 Harv. L. Rev. 429, 436-438 (1932).
2s3 Beale, Conflict of Laws 1574-1575 (1935); Rest., Conflict of Laws §§ 535, 545, 546
(1934); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 445-447 (1927); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 424-426
(1937).
26 Unless the receiver possesses a negotiable instrument or certificate representing the asset.
3 Beale, Conflict of Laws 1576 (1935); Rest., Conflict of Laws §§ 547, 548 (i934); Stumberg,
Conflict of Laws 426 (i937).
27 3 Beale, Conflict of Laws x588 (1935); Rest. Conflict of Laws, § 567 (i934); but see Clark
v. Williard, 292 U.S. 112 (1933), 294 U.S. 211 (934).
18 Where foreclosure of far-flung properties is sought to secure an issue of corporate bonds,
a state which can serve both mortgagor and trustee can compel them to join in the foreclosure
deed. 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 948 (1935); Rest., Conflict of Laws § 97, Comment c, § 449 (2)
(1934).
29 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 947 (1935); Rest., Conflict of Laws § 97, Comment c, § 227
(1934).
30 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 969-971 (1935); Rest., Conflict of Laws § 249 (x934); Stum-
berg, Conflict of Laws 407-408, 100 (1937).
3' 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 965-966 (1935); Rest., Conflict of Laws § 245 (1934); Stum-
berg, Conflict of Laws 376-378 (1937).
"2 See Wohl, The Nationalization of Joint Stock Banking Corporations in Soviet Russia,
75 U. of Pa. L.. Rev. 385, 527, 622 (1927) for a description of the revolutionary procedure in
the Soviet Union. For typical decrees, see Nebolsine, The Recovery of the Foreign Assets of
Nationalized Russian Corporations, 39 Yale L. J. 113o, n. 2 (193o) and Russian C. & I. Bank
v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse, [1925] A.C. I12, 120-123.
33 See generally, i Beale, Conflict of Laws 417-422 (i935); Rest., Conflict of Laws § 97,
Comment a and illustrations (i934); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 95-96 (1937).
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when they have before them a defaulting trustee,34 a defaulting contractor, 35
or a person who obtained the property by a fraudulent device.36 The compul-
sory deed resulting from such an order will be upheld where the land is because
the compulsion was legal.37 This line of cases is particularly strong because land
is peculiarly subject to local law.38 Aided by favorable construction, there are
some striking parallels to the situation in many of the Russian cases. The
Soviet Union had the Russian corporations within its jurisdiction; it regarded
those corporations as defrauders and defaulters by the standards of the new
order of communism; confiscation was legal compulsion in Russia; the con-
fiscation decrees, although they have been construed otherwise, are inclusive
enough to be construed as orders to convey foreign property to the Soviet
government. 39 But objections are readily discoverable. The mere statement
of the parallels is enough to show that a non-Russian court could hardly be
expected to be so generous on questions of construction. Further, there is no
evidence that such conveyances were actually made.40 Finally, local anti-con-
fiscatory law or policy is a handy shield against application of Russian law
even if it were found the proper law.4y
Considering the Russian cases and their analogies in respect to tangible
property located abroad, it seems that recognition of the territorial limitation
upon a state's executive power is the real basis for refusal of foreign states to
give the confiscation decrees extraterritorial force, if a legal rationale for the
Russian cases must be found.
Where the property is intangible as in the Belmont case, the same approach
may be used. Thus, if the situs of the intangible was in Russia at the time of
the decrees, the decrees are effective;42 if it was outside Russia, the decrees are
not effective. This seems to be the view in the Russian cases.43 However, the
34 Clark v. Iowa Fruit Co., 185 Fed. 6o4 (C.C.D. Mo. i911).
35 Wrightsville Hardware Co. v. Assets Realization Co., 159 App. Div. 849, 144 N.Y.S. 99i
(93); Sutphen v. Fowler, 9 Paige (N.Y.) 280 (1841).
36 Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch (U.S.) 148 (i81o).
37 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws 422 (1935).
38 Clark v. Graham, 6 Wheat. (U.S.) 577 (1821); Swank v. Hufnagle, iii Ind. 453, 12 N.E.
303 (x887); Sell v. Miller, ii Ohio State 331 (z86o).
39 Note 32, supra.
40 See Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N.J. Eq. 56i, 566, 30 At. 676, 677 (1894).
41 But American courts have gone further in this type of case by formulating decrees implicit-
ly requiring acts done on foreign territory. Salton Sea Cases, 172 Fed. 792 (C.C.A. 9th I909);
see Vineyard, etc., Co. v. Twin Falls, etc., Co., 245 Fed. 9 (C.C.A. 9th x917), 31 Harv. L. Rev.
646 (1918); cf. i Beale, Conflict of Laws 433-434 (I935).
"Dame P. v. S., Trib. Sup. Zurich, Dec. i8, 1928, 57 Clunet ii5.
43 United States: Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. i58, 145 N.E. 917 (1924);
James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 239 N.Y. 248, 146 N.E. 369 (1925); Volgakama Joint-
Stock Co. v. National City Bank, 240 N.Y. 368, 148 N.E. 552 (1925); Vladikavkazsky Ry. Co.
v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, i89 N.E. 456 (i934); Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of
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formula is not quite so easy to apply. There are at least eight different views
-all of them somewhat objectionable-as to the situs of a debt.44
It is situated at the creditor's domicil for purposes of taxation by the state
benefiting by the taxation;45 or at the business situs.46 It is situated at the
debtor's domicil for purposes of escheat by the state benefiting by the escheat.47
It is situated where the debtor to the principal debtor can be found for purposes
of garnishment by the state which has a law providing for the attachment of
such a debt to be upheld.48 In the Russian cases, debts with any foreign con-
New York and Trust Co., i6i Misc. 903, 294 N.Y. Supp. 648 (1937); Day-Gormley Leather
Co. v. Nat'l. City Bank, 8 F. Supp. 503 (S.D. N.Y. 1934); cf. Dougherty v. Equitable Life
Assur:Soc., 266 N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897 (i934).
England: In re Russian Bank for Foreign Trade, [i933] Ch. D. 745; Russian C. and I.
Bank v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse, [1925] A.C. 112; Banque Internationale v.
Goukassow, [1925] A.C. 1so; First Russian Ins. Co. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co. [1928]
Ch.D. 922; Woronin v. Huth & Co., unreported K.B.D. decision, 55 Clunet 756 (1928);
Buerger v. New York Life Assur. Co., 43 T.L.R. 6oi (1927); cf. Perry v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc., 45 T.L.R. 468 (1929).
France: Socit6 d'Assurance Ph6nix Espagnol v. Cockerill, Cour de Cass., July 4, 1933, 6i
Clunet 662; Teslenko v. Banque Russo-Asiatique, Cour de Paris, June 22, 1929, 56 Clunet
11io; Lalande v. Banque Russe, Trib. Comm. Seine, June 29, 1932, 6x Clunet 663; Kharon v.
Banque Russe, Trib. Civ. Seine, May 20, 1921, 5o Clunet 533; cf. Wildenburg v. Comptoir
National d'Escompte, Trib. Comm. Seine, Jan. 15, 1934, 6i Clunet 653.
Sweden: By a decision of the Supreme Court of Sweden, the Paris branch of a Russian bank
recovered a deposit in a Swedish bank, according to a report in the Rouskoe Slovko of New York,
April io, i93o, noted in Nebolsine, Recovery of Foreign Assets of Nationalized Russian Cor-
porations, 39 Yale L. J. 1130, 1146 n. 49 (1930).
Denmark: Council of Russian Orthodox Community v. Legation of R.S.F.S.R., Supreme
Court, Oct. 22, 1925, Ann. Dig. of Int'l. Law Cas. 24 (1925-26), Nebolsine, op. cit. supra ii6o
n. 98 (1930).
Germany: Ginsberg v. Deutsche Bank, K.G., March 3, 1925, 1 Ostrecht 163. This decision
was reversed on rehearing three years later. Juristische Wochenschrift 1232 (1928). Art. 30
of the E.G.B.G.B. reads: "The application of a foreign law is excluded if the application would
contravene good morals, or the purpose of a German law." Nebolsine, op. cit. supra 1159 n. 55
(1930). The decision both ways turned on the interpretation of that article. After the Treaty
of Rapallo, Art. 30 was held inapplicable to the operation of Soviet law. In re Spahn and Son,
R. G., May 20, 1930, 6x Clunet 147.
Switzerland: Wilbuschewitz v. Zurich, Trib. Fed., July 13, 1925, 53 Clunet iio.
Poland, Latvia, Esthonla: By legislation, Russian corporations were dissolved and their as-
sets distributed to local claimants. Makarov, The Legal Status of Assets Abroad Owned by
Nationalized Russian Stock Companies (unpublished paper by A. N. Makarov, former Pro-
fessor of Law at the University of Petrograd).
44 Carpenter, Jurisdiction over Debts, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 9o5, 907-908 (i918).
4s Beidler v. S.C. Tax Commission, 282 U.S. 1 (1930). See Carpenter, Jurisdiction over
Debts, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 905, 922, n. 56, for a collection of the cases.
46 Bluefields Banana Co. v. Board of Assessors, 49 La. Ann. 43, 21 So. 627 (1897); 1 Beale,
Conflict of Laws 304, 588-593, 619 (I935).
47 Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
48 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (I905).
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nections owed to Russian corporations have been held situated abroad for the
purpose of ascertaining the effect of the Russian confiscation decrees by courts
likewise situated abroad.49 Other formulas for the situs of a debt would place
the debt in the Belmont case somewhere outside Russia: the domicil of the
debtor,5O the place where the original transaction which gave rise to the debt
occurred,S' the places where the debtor can be found,52 the places where the
debt is recoverable,S3 the places having the power to control the debtor.S4
But it is now old learning that a debt is a relation between persons only and
consequently has situs only in a fictitious, question-begging sense.ss The cases
are not inconsistent-the "situs" depending each time on the purpose for
which it was to be determined s6 The old view that it is at the domicil of the
creditor, based on the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam7 has yielded today
to the view that one fiction-ascribing situs to any debts$-is enough and must
be flexible according to the purpose invoked.
The real question, then, for purposes of confiscation is whether the state of
the creditor or the state of the debtor has effective control. Accepting the
modern doctrine, it can be argued that the situs of a debt for the purpose of
taxation is at the creditor's domicil,59 that confiscation is like taxation, ° that
therefore the Soviet government could tax or appropriate the debt to one of
its corporations created by a deposit in New York. The distinction between
taxation and confiscation, like most distinctions, is one of degree. 6x That there
was confiscation, not mere taxation, by the Soviet government is clear from
the intention of the decrees to leave the corporations absolutely nothing.62 If,
in the Belmont case, a certificate of deposit had been in Russia at the time the
confiscation decrees were enforced, the modern tendency to identify the debt
with its tangible evidence, even in the case of a non-negotiable chose in action,
49 See cases collected in note 43, supra.
so Jackson v. Tiernan, 15 La. 485 (i84o); Minor, Conflict of Laws 276-277 (Igoi),
s' Cheshire, Private International Law 352-354 (i935).
5 Harris v. Balk, i98 U.S. 215 (x9o4); Rest., Conflict of Laws § 1o8 (1934).
S3 In re Russian Bank for Foreign Trade, [1933] Ch. D. 745.
54 Carpenter, Jurisdiction over Debts, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 9a5 (igiS).
ss z Beale, Conflict of Laws 302 (1935).
56 16 Harv. L. Rev. 63 (1902).
57 Story, Conflict of Laws §§ 376-381,397-399, but cf. § 383, n. (a) (8th ed. i883); Wharton,
Conflict of Laws § 363 (3d ed. 19o5).
s i Beale, Conflict of Laws 301-302 (r935).
59 Beidler v. S.C. Tax Commission, 282 U.S. i (1930).
6
°Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 3 K.B. 532, 559; Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542-543
(1926); Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24-25 (zgs).
61 Holmes, J., dissenting in Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 631 (19o6).
62 See Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. i58, 145 N.E. 917 (1924), where effect of
the confiscation decrees was sought to be sustained as a "revolutionary tax."
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for the sake of commercial convenience would provide an argument for locating
the debt in Russia.63
Control of the owner-creditor may be enough to transfer a debt. Intangible
property, such as the beneficial interest in a New York insurance policy, can
be transferred by operation of law in the state of domicil of the owner, who
was outside the jurisdiction.64 Also jurisdiction over shareholder alone is
enough to transfer shares of stock in a foreign corporation by confiscatory
operation of law.6
s
Further, it is by no means clear that control over the debtor alone is enough.
It has been held that Soviet jurisdiction of an American debtor was not suffi-
cient to transfer a contract obligation, performable in Russia, to the Soviet
Union,6 6 unless the contract specifically stated Russian law was applicable to
all questions about performance of the contract. 67 Again, much the same result
was reached in the state insolvency cases in which discharge of foreign creditors
could not be accomplished by control of the state over the debtor.6" Finally,
it is arguable that Harris v. Balk69 is distinguishable because the principal
debtor is protected--viz., has his debt to the garnishor, or part of it, paid. Of
course, it does not follow that some state must always have sufficient control
over a given debtor-creditor relation to make an effective confiscation of the
debt. Yet such a view seems as plausible in the case of a debt as it does in the
case of a chattel whose owner is in another state.
It may be useful to consider whether formal changes in the decrees would
affect the result.70 Suppose the confiscation decrees are viewed as raising a
debt owed by the Russian corporations to the Soviet government for the value
of all their property, including that located abroad? In the Belmont case, then,
the assignment to the United States was a transfer of a creditor's right against
the Russian corporation, and the United States garnisheed the New York
debtor to the Russian corporation, where the debtor was found.71 The objection
63 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 362-364 (1927); Rest., Conflict of Laws § 50-53 (i934).
64 Carter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., xo Hawaiian Rep. 559 (i896).
6s Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U.S. Steel Corp., 267 U.S. 22 (1924).
6 Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924).
67 Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 266 N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897 (1934); Perry v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 45 T.L.R. 468 (1929).
68 Phoenix Nat. Bank v. Batcheller, iI Mass. 589, 24 N.E. 917 (i89o).
69 198 U.S. 215 (1904). In that case it was held that a judgment in favor of a garnishor
against the garnishee, who was temporarily in the state, is entitled to full faith and credit, al-
though the principal debtor was not before the court.
70 Had the Soviet Union purported to compensate the Russian corporations, which it did
not, would there have been any confiscation, even though compensations were grossly inade-
quate? When the United States confiscates property, a promise to compensate is implied.
Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 48T (2930).
7x Harris v. Balk, i98 U.S. 215 (29o4); Kennedy, Garnishment of Intangible Debts, 35
Yale L. J. 689 (1926); 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws 454-467 (I934); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws
101-104 (I937); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 126-131 (1927); Rest., Conflict of Laws § io8,
Comment b (I934).
NOTES
of unfairness to the principal debtor is not available because the Russian cor-
poration, too, can be served in New York. 72 The question of the validity of
the confiscation can in this way be litigated among the three interested parties.
The notion that a court would adopt such an interpretation of the confiscation
decrees is preposterous enough, but it is interesting to observe how a change
of legal language from "confiscation" to "debt" could change legal sympathies.
Suppose the confiscation decrees are viewed as an appropriation of the shares
of Russian corporations by the Soviet Union? As between corporation and
shareholders, the law of the state of incorporation is final,73 although it is said,
as between transferor and transferee of shares the law of the place is appli-
cable,74 but the law of the state of incorporation can finally control even this
question.75 A transfer of corporate shares can be made in the state of incor-
poration although the certificates representing the shares are not in the state7
6
Such a transfer will be upheld abroad.77 When a confiscatory transfer has been
made abroad, the transferee government is not secure until the state of incor-
poration upholds the transfer,7T which may be refused if the state of incorpora-
tion also has legislated confiscation of the shares. 9 Following the supposed
construction of the Soviet decrees the right the United States received by as-
7 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws 465-467 (1935); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 131 (1927); Stum-
berg, Conflict of Laws 104 (1937).
73 Hammond v. Hastings, 134 U.S. 401 (1889); Shaw v. Goebel Brewing Co., 202 Fed. 408
(C.C.A. 6th 1913); Black v. Zacharie & Co., 3 How. (U.S.) 482 (1845); Boyette v. Preston
Motors Corp., 2o6 Ala. 240, 89 So. 746 (1921); Hunt v. Drug, Inc., 5 Harr. (Dela.) 332, 156
Atl. 384 (1931); Masury v. Ark. National Bank, 87 Fed. 381 (E.D. Ark. 1898), reversed on
other grounds 93 Fed. 603 (C.C.A. 8th 1899); Moore v. Gennett, 2 Tenn. Ch. 375 (1875);
State v. Dunlap, 28 Idaho 784, 156 Pac. 141 (i916); Husband v. Linehan, i68 Ky. 304, 181
S.W. io89 (1916); 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 888-89o, 984-985 (1935); i Beale, op. cit., 303-304;
Rest., Conflict of Laws § 53(I), Comment a, illustrations, § 262(I) (i934); Cheshire, Private
International Law 367-368 (1935). See Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 336-338 (1937).
74 Mylander v. Chesapeake Bank, 162 Md. 255, i59 AUt. 770 (1932); London, Paris, &
American Bank v. Aronstein, 11i7 Fed. 6oi (C.C.A. 9th 1902); Rest., Conflict of Laws §§ 53(2),
262(2) Comment d (i934); 3 Beale, Conflict of Laws 1498-15o (1935); Cheshire, Private
International Law 368 (1935). Where place of contract to transfer is same as place of incorpora-
tion, a court emphasized contract not incorporation. Goewey v. Sanborn, 277 Mass. i68, 179
N.E. 237 (193i).
7s Hunt v. Drug, Inc., 5 Harr. (Dela.) 332, 156 AUt. 384 (i931); Black v. Zacharie, 3 How.
(U.S.) 482 (1845); Moore v. Gennett, 2 Tenn. Ch. 375 (1875); Husband v. Linehan, i68 Ky.
304, I8i S.W. io89 (1916); Rest., Conflict of Laws §§ 53(3), 262(3) (1934); 2 Beale, Conflict
of Laws 984-985 (i935); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 338 (i937). Contra: London, Paris &
American Bank v. Aronstein, 117 Fed. 6oi (C.C.A. 9 th 1902).
76 Shaw v. Goebel Brewing Co., 202 Fed. 4o8 (C.C.A. 6th 1913); Boyette v. Preston Motors
Co., 2o6 Ala. 240, 89 So. 746 (r921); Masury v. Ark. Nat. Bank, 87 Fed. 381 (E.D. Ark. 1898),
reversed on other grounds, 93 Fed. 603 (C.C.A. 8th 1899).
'7 Shaw v. Goebel Brewing Co., 202 Fed. 408 (C.C.A. 6th 1913).
78 Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U.S. Steel Corp., 267 U.S. 22 (1924).
79 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 888-89o (I935). See Canadian Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard,
109 U.S. 527 (1883).
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signment in the Belmont case was that of sole shareholder in the Russian corpor-
ation. Subject to claims of creditors, the United States would recover the whole
amount of the deposit made by the corporation in New York. The implication
of the theory that the Soviet Union acquired the shares of Russian corporation
have been disregarded by all the Russian cases, though it has been admitted
that the decrees had that effect among othersY° The fact that many lines of
business were "nationalized"'8 by the Soviet government lends credence to
the theory, because to own the stock is to control the corporations.
But except as to chattels subjected to confiscation in the Soviet Union and
subsequently brought out, the old slogans of defeated comity and victorious
public policy have in fact ruled the cases.12 The harsh injustice of uncompen-
sated confiscation is granted, but the courts might more cogently have arrived
at much the same result if they had faced more of the problems.
II
The strong feelings about confiscation undoubtedly also led to a judicial
readiness to find that the Russian corporations were not dissolved by the Rus-
sian decrees in 1918. The most apparent means of defeating the claims of the
Russian corporations was to show the corporations did not exist for purposes
of suing and being sued in the forum. But the arguments employed by the
corporations to show their continued existence in spite of the Soviet dissolution
decrees were eminently successful. It was contended in many courts of the
world that Russian corporations had corporate existence after the Soviet dis-
solution decrees because the Soviet Union was not recognized politically. This
argument was successful before all courts which entertained the question,83
8o Russian C. and I. Bank v. Comptoird'Escomptede Mulhouse, [1925] A.C. 112, 121, 124.
81 Wohl, The Nationalization of joint-Stock Banking Corporations in Soviet Russia, 75
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 385, 527, 622 (1927).
82 Borchard, Confiscations: Extraterritorial and Domestic, 31 Am. J. Int. Law 675 (1937).
83 England: Non-recognition caused a British court to behave as though nothing happened
in Russia, 1917-1921, Luther v. Sagor, [i921] I K.B. 456, until recognition compelled reversal
of the same case. Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 3 K.B. 532.
France: Prior to recognition, Russian corporations could be sued in French courts, Societ6
Sago v. Soci6t6 Russe de Transport et d'Assurance, Trib. Comm. Seine, Nov. 3, I923, 54
Clunet 349; Soci~t6 X v. Banque Y. Trib. Comm. Seine, Nov. 29, 1923, 54 Clunet 35o, and
Soviet decrees- were ignored. Hornstein v. Banque Russo-Asiatique, Trib. Comm. Seine
April 15, 1924, 54 Clunet 1075; Bounatian v. Soci~t6 Optorg, Trib. Civ. Seine, Dec. 12, 1923,
5T Clunet 133.
United States: The effect of non-recognition upon the standing of the Soviet government
was severe; it had no capacity to sue, The Rogdai, 278 Fed. 294 (N.D. Cal. 192o) and 279 Fed.
13o (N.D. Cal. 1920); The Penza, 277 Fed. 91 (E.D. N.Y. 1921); R.S.F.S.R. v. Cibrario, 235
N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923); or be sued, Wulfsohn v. R.S.F.S.R., 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E.
N.E. 24 (1923); and must helplessly observe representatives of the government it succeeded
recover a public claim. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. State of Russia, 21 F. (2d) 396 (C.C.A. 2d
1927). But the effect of non-recognition on private litigation was mitigated by judicial recog-
nition of political and economic realities within Soviet territory, Banque de France v. Equita-
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except the highest Swiss court,84 holding, despite non-recognition of the Soviet
Union, that a Russian corporation no longer existed in Switzerland.
Political recognition of the Soviet Union by most countries subtracted one
argument from a multitude against application of the Soviet dissolution decrees
to Russian corporations. The English courts discovered by inspection of the
relevant Soviet decrees that Russian corporations were not dissolved but only
liquidated and therefore existent15 Subsequently, they reached the same result
by attributing the existence of Russian corporations to registration of branch
offices under the Companies Act. 86 The French courts invented certain require-
ments17 for the establishment of a defacto corporate domicil in France.s8 Simi-
larly, a German court in 1925 held a Russian bank was a juristic person in
ble Trust Co., 33 F. (2d) 2o2 (C.C.A. 2d 1929); Salinmoff v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220,
193 N.E. 679 (1933); contra, Bourne v. Bourne, 2o9 App. Div. 419, 204 N.Y. Supp. 866 (1924).
Generally, the American courts attributed existence to Russian corporations on grounds other
than non-recognition, P.M.K. Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 170 N.E. 479 (1930);
cf. Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N.Y. 149, 147 N.E. 703 (925), and so recogni-
tion in 1933 did not affect the result. Vladikavkazsky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., 263
N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456 (1934). But cf. Doughtery v. Eq. Life Assur. Soc., 266 N.Y. 71, 193
N.E. 897 (934).
84 Banque Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd v. Hausner, Trib. Fed., Oct. io,
1924, 52 Clunet 488.
85 Russian C. and I. Bank v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse, [1925] A.C. 112; Banque
Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd v. Goukassow, [2925] A.C. 15o; Sea Insurance Co.
v. Russia Ins. Co., [1924] Lloyd's L. Rep. 308; Woronin v. Huth & Co., unreported K.B.D.
decision, 55 Clunet 756 (2928). But cf. Lazard Bros. and Co. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., ['9331
A.C. 289.
English courts admitted confiscations had occurred in Russia, White v. Eagle S. and B.
Dominion Ins. Co., 127L.T. 571, 38 T.L.R. 616 (1922), but were troubled by the concession
theory of corporate existence giving autocratic power of life and death over corporations to the
state of incorporation. Russian and English Bank v. Baring Bros., 246 L.T. 424 (1932).
86 Section 274, Companies Act (i9o8), 8 Edw. VII, c. 69, § 274. Employers Liability Assur.
Corp. v. Sedgwick, Collins & Co., [2927] A.C. 95; Sabatier v. Trading Co., [2927] 1 Ch.D. 495.
Later, Russian corporations were held to exist for purposes of winding up under the Companies
Act of 2929, I9-20 Geo. V. c. 23, § 338(2). In re Russian Bank for Foreign Trade, [i933] Ch. D.
745. But Russian corporations do not exist for the purpose of stockholders' suit. Russian and
English Bank v. Baring Bros., 246 L.T. 424 (1932).
87 The corporation must show retention of its powers to sue in French courts, Banque In-
dustrielle de Moscou v. Banque de Pays du Nord, Trib. Civ. Seine, May 22, 2924, 54 Clunet
35o, authorization of their representatives, Kamenka v. Cahn, Trib. Comm. Seine, Jan. ii,
2927, 54 Clunet 362, and a transfer to France in conformity to Art. 420, Code Civ. de Proc.
Soci6t6 v. Banque Russe, Trib. Comm. Seine, Nov. 26, 2925, 54 Clunet 354; Krivitzky v.
Banque Russe, Trib. Comm. Seine, Nov. i9, 1927, 55 Clunet 132; Karagoulian v. Banque
Russe pour le Commerce et PIndustrie, Cour de Paris, May 17, 2927, 55 Clunet 132.
98 Banque Russo-Asiatique, Trib. Civ. Seine, Mar. 23, 1925, 54 Clunet 352; Banque Russe
pour le Commerce Etranger, Trib. Civ. Seine, May 3, 1926, 54 Clunet 358; Z6lenoffv. Banque
de Commerce de Sib6rie, Cour d'Appel de Paris, Jan. 31, 1928, 55 Clunet 629; Cie. v. Soci6t6
d'Assurance Y, Trib. Comm. Seine, May i, 1925, 54 Clunet 353; Banque de Sib6rie v. Vairon
et Cie., Cour de Bordeaux, Jan. 2, 1928, 56 Clunet uS, Cour de Cass., July 29, 1929, 57 Clunet
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American courts have endowed internationally foreign corporations with
new life at the instance of American creditors in spite of dissolution by the
recognized government of the corporate domicil.9o Dissolution by an unrecog-
nized government, like the Soviet Union until 1933, has not disturbed the
standing of Russian corporations before the courts in the United States91 if
properly pleaded.92 Their existence has been justified by various legal plati-
tudes. For example, the assertor of the nonexistence of a Russian corporation
may be estopped by his behavior in having treated it as a corporate entity.93
Or conceding-without considering the legal difficulties-corporate existence
in the forum to Russian corporations, some courts refer to the extraterritorial
impotency94 of the Soviet dissolution decrees resulting from non-recognition
of the Soviet Union by the United States.95 Or they refer to the repugnance
of the decrees to the public policy of the forum.96 On the other hand, the exis-
tence of Russian corporations in the forum has been admirably sustained by
sheer judicial ingenuity. Mr. Justice Cardozo in P.M.K. Bank v. National City
68o; National City Bank v. Soci6t6 Renault Russe, Trib. Comm. Seine, July12, 2929, 56 Clun-
et I122, 57 Clunet 400.
If the Russian corporation could not show a de facto corporate domicile its existence was
termed "precarious," Banque G~n~rale v. Jaudon, Trib. Civ. Seine, Dec. 23, 1924, 52 Clunet
419, and under an ordinance of Nov. 29, 1924, see 52 Clunet 531 for text, its liquidation was
compulsory. Cie. Nord de Moscou v. Ph6nix Espagnol, Trib. de Paris, June 13, x928, 56 Clunet
rig; Vlasto v. Banque Russo-Asiatique, Trib. Comm. Seine, April 26, 1922, 5o Clunet 933.
89 Ginsberg v. Deutsche Banque, K.G. Berlin, Mar. 3, 1925, 1O Ostrecht 163, reversed,
Juristische Wochenschrift 1232 (1928), cited by Nebolsine, The Recovery of the Foreign As-
sets of Nationalized Russian Corporations, 39 Yale L. J. 113o, i 44-45, n. 42-45 (1930).
91 Hamilton v. Accessory Transit Co., 26 Barb. (N.Y.) 46 (1857); Mitchell v. Banco de
Londres y Mexico, 192 App. Div. 720, 183 N.Y. Supp. 446 (X920); Issaia v. Russo-Asiatic
Bank, 266 N.Y. 37, 193 N.E. 543 (1934) as interpreted in Issaia v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 155
Misc. 495, 499-500, 280 N.Y. Supp. 735, 739-741 (1935).
91 P.M.K. Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 17o N.E. 479 (1930); see Fletcher,
Cyc. Corp. § 8581 (1933). A dissolved Russian corporation, however, may not be capable of
making an effective assignment. Severnoe Securities Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co.,
255 N.Y. 120, 174 N.E. 299 (1931).
92 Gumoens v. Equitable Trust Co., 201 N.Y. Supp. 96 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
93 Joint Stock Co. of Volgakama Oil & Chem. Factory v. National City Bank, 240 N.Y.
368, 148 N.E. 552 (1925), Wulfsohn v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, ii F. (2d) 715 (C.C.A. 9th 1926).
94 Hennenlotter v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Society, 124 Misc. 626, 207 N.Y. Supp. 588
(1924); First Russian Ins. Co. v. Beha, 240 N.Y. 6oi, 148 N.E. 722 (1925).
95 James & Co. v. Rossia Ins. Co. of America, 247 N.Y. 262, i6o N.E. 364 (1928); Russian
Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N.Y. 149, 147 N.E. 703 (1925).
96 James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 239 N.Y. 248, 146 N.E. 369 (1925); Joint Stock
Co. of Volgakama Oil & Chem. Factory v. National City Bank, 240 N.Y. 368, 148 N.E. 552
(1925); James & Co. v. Rossia Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 263, 16o N.E. 364 (1928).
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Bank97 grasped the presumption of continued corporate existence and propped
it up with a theory of spontaneous corporate existence. 98
The courts of this country have never been idle in discovering means of
invigorating corporations which are in de facto dissolution in the state of in-
corporation.99 If dissolution is admitted, a statute or terms of the dissolution
decree can usually be found to extend its existence for the purpose of suing and
being sued.00
The ingenuity expended in avoiding a finding of dissolution in the state of
incorporation or, if found, in avoiding its effect suggests that the theory of
corporate existence which holds the corporate personality is a revocable con-
cession from the state'0' is unsatisfactory when the interests of the forum de-
mand continued existence of a corporation. The theory that an association
of persons dedicated to certain objects has a natural, spontaneous existence as
a corporation °2 suits the purposes of capitalistic courts in the Russian cases,
but involves the inconvenience of determining when such a corporation begins
and ends existence which are not found in the more arbitrary concession theory;
if the theory of spontaneous existence were put in general use the difficulties
would multiply. Would families, football teams, and political parties be corpor-
ations? The United States Supreme Court has long embraced the concession
theory of corporate existence,103 and its latest expression on the question of
corporate dissolution expressly adopts that theory.'04 Adversaries of Russian
corporations challenging their existence had strong arguments of authority and
convenience, but met with failure. There is no suggestion in the cases that
states might have absolute power to create but not necessarily to destroy cor-
porations.
Perhaps the corporate fiction in the Russian cases has been overemphasized
97 253 N.Y. 23, 17o N.E. 479 (1930).
91 See note 102, i ifra.
99 Brock v. Poor, 216 N.Y. 387, II N.E. 229 (I915); Speerv. Colbert, 200U.S. 13o (19o5);
Folger v. Columbia Ins. Co., 09 Mass. 267 (1868), aff'd 20 Wall. (U.S.) i (1873).
-oo Kelly v. Int'l. Clay Products Co., 291 Pa. St. 383, I4O AtU. 143 (1928); Lycoming Fire
Ins. Co. v. Langley, 62 Md. 196 (1884); DeWitt Shoe Co. v. Mills, 224 Ala. 500, 140 So. 578
(1932); Hunt v. Columbian Ins. Co., 55 Me. 290 (1867); i6 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § &i69 (i933).
10, Dewey, The Corporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale L. J. 655, 666-669 (1926); Cleveland,
Status in Common Law, 38 Harv. L. Rev. i074, 1087-1090 (1925); Machen, Corporate Per-
sonality, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 253, 257, 36o-362 (1gi); Young, The Legal Personality of a For-
eign Corporation, 22 Law Q. Rev. 178 (igo6); 3 Maitland, Collected Papers 308-314 (Ig1);
6 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 354-358 (193).
1o2 Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 Col. L. Rev. 643 (1932);
Dewey, The Corporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale L. J. 655, 658, 67o-673 (1926); Dicey, Law
and Opinion in England 153 (19o5); 17 Harv. L. Rev. 511, 513 (I9O4); Laski, The Personality
of Associations, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 404 (igi6); 3 Maitland, Collected Papers 314-319 (Igi).
203 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 5I9 (1839).
X04 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg., Corp., 58 S. Ct. 125
('937).
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by excursions of the courts into theories of corporate existence. The real prob-
lem was to provide groups of expropriated individuals a convenient method of
suing for their property abroad. They were permitted to use the corporation
as plaintiff and defendant as a procedural device in the forum for the con-
venience of both court and parties. These cases may indicate that the nature
of the corporate entity, when it is a question of suing or being sued as dis-
tinguished from a question of limited liability, is merely a question of pro-
cedure, and hence, under the old formula of the conflict of laws, is to be deter-
mined by the law of the forum.105
III
With all doubts about the effect of the Soviet confiscation and dissolution
decrees on Russian corporate property recoverable abroad resolved in favor
of those claiming under the Russian corporations by the courts of the world,
the importance of the executive agreement in the Belmont case which reached
a different result cannot be ignored.
In view of further explanatory memoranda exchanged between the Soviet
Union and the United States in July, 1936, there is no question but that claims
based on the confiscation decrees were included in the assignment."o6
The court took a desirable step beyond the precedents in treating the execu-
tive agreement as a treaty for the purpose of superseding New York law,"° 7
because the added sanction to such agreements will facilitate the business of
the Department of State in the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United
States.x0 8 The exclusion, in the Belmont case, of Russian nationals who have
a claim under the corporation from the use of Federal law as a defense to the
claim of the United States under the assignment may later be regarded as a
dictum.109 If not, it modifies a previous decision, Russian Volunteer Fleet v.
United States,"0 which held that the United States cannot under the Fifth
Amendment confiscate the right to the performance of a contract from alien
friends without compensation. The position of the alien friends in that case,
however, is distinguishable from the position of the Russian nationals in the
Belmont case, because the latter's own government initiated the confiscation
105 3 Beale, Conflict of Laws, 16o3 (i935); Rest. Conflict of Laws § 588 (1935).
o61 Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York and Trust Co., 16i Misc. 903, 910-911,
294 N.Y. Supp. 648, 66o (1937).
107 An executive agreement is a treaty for the purpose of direct appeal to the United States
Supreme Court on a point of construction. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583
(191).
208 See Moore, Executive Treaties and Agreements, 20P oli. Sci. Quart. 385 (19o5); Garner,
Acts and joint Resolutions of Congress as Substitutes for Treaties, 29 Am. J. Int. Law 482
(1935).
X09 Claimants who are Russian nationals were not before the court. 30I U.S. 324, 332
(r937).
"'0 287 U.S. 481 (1930).
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to which the United States is a mere auxiliary. Although not expressly men-
tioned in the Belmont case, it seems likely that non-Russian foreign claimants
under the Russian corporation will be protected by the Fifth Amendment as
friendly aliens within the rule of the Russian Volunteer Fleet case. Further, it
should be noted, that although treaties have been examined and upheld under
the Federal Constitution,x' not one has ever been held unconstitutional."2 It
remains, however, to see how far this judicial patience can be pushed.113 Con-
ceivably, the Belmont case opens a novel field of power to the executive depart-
ment of the United States through the use of executive agreements and treaties,
a field that has long been subject to the speculations of law writers.- 4
The necessity of forbidding palpably unconstitutional acts has sometimes
been evaded by the Supreme Court by refuge in the doctrine of political ques-
tions,-5 but this doctrine was not relied on in the Belmont case. The doctrine
has been applied only to the negotiation," 6 violation,117 and termination,"" of
treaties, not to their domestic effect in the United States,"19 although treaties,
conventions, protocols, and executive agreements are the final products of the
higher politics.
-' Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (i9,9); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1904);
United States v. Reid, 73 F. (2d) 153 (C.C.A. 9th 1934).
A treaty that would be unconstitutional if it were a statute is not unconstitutional. United
States v. Thompson, 258 Fed. 257 (E.D. Ark. i929); United States v. Reid, 73 F. (2d) 153
(C.C.A. 9th 1934).
112 A treaty has never been declared unconstitutional. Field, Doctrine of Political Ques-
tions, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 489, n. 21 (1924).
"13 See DeGeofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (x889); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341
(1923); The Cherokee Tobacco, ii Wall. (U.S.) 616, 62o-62i (1870), for dicta asserting treaties
can be held unconstitutional.
"14 Dowling, Cas. on Const. Law 391, n. 2 (1937).
"1S Luther v. Borden, 7 How. (U.S.) 1 (2849).
n6 Doe v. Braden, i6 How. (U.S.) 635 (1853).
XZ7 Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curt. (U.S. C.C.) 454,461, ajJ'd 2 Black (U.S.) 481 (1862); Ware v.
Hylton, 3 Dall. (U.S.) 199, 260 (1796).
118 Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. (U.S.) 199, 261 (1796).
"19 Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 485,
486-490 (1924). Cf. Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 5 Pet. (U.S.) 1(831), and Finkel-
stein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 338,351-352 (1924). Jurisdiction in that case,
however, was denied because the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign state and therefore was
not a proper party. Chief Justice Marshall expressly left undecided the question whether the
equitable relief demanded "savours too much of the exercise of political power to be within the
proper province of the judicial department." 5 Pet. (U.S.) 1, 20 (1831).
